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YUSIFA SAYIGH 
Arab Economic Strategy in a 
Changing World Oil Market 
Introduction 
During the early 1980s, the international oil market has changed from a sellers' 
to a buyers' market, that is, from one where the producers-exporters 
largely determined the price for that volume of exports which the market was 
willing (and eager) to buy, to one in which the importers-consumers have been 
able to press the price downwards and are willing only to buy a much smaller 
volume for the reduced price, than they had been buying by the end of the 
1970s. But this identification of the current situation as one of crisis is only 
good enough as a first approximation. To be useful for the purposes of our 
analysis, it should be sharpened by several qualifications:' 
1) Obviously, what is a crisis for the oil producers (a drop in demand, a drop in 
export price, a drop in production, and therefore a drop in export revenue) is a 
welcome development for importers (a smaller import bill, a smaller outward 
transfer of financial resources, a smaller degree of dependence on the foreign 
suppliers of a vital and strategic source of energy). 
2) The impact of the crisis has hit all the members of OPEC (Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) and OAPEC (Organisation of Arab Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries) but the Arab members of OPEC have suffered a 
much greater shrinkage in their production and revenues, absolutely and 
relatively, than the non-Arab members. 
3) Non-OPEC exporters (United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Canada, and the 
Soviet Union) have expanded their production over the three years 1980-2. 
4) Although demand for, and production and consumption of, energy from all 
sources combined have dropped since the end of the 1 970s, the drop has been 
very small (about 1.6 per cent), while the demand for, and the production and 
consumption of, oil have dropped by about 12 per cent during the same period. 
In fact, the efforts to conserve energy and the effects of economic stagnation in 
the Western industrial countries (OECD), have been wholly reflected in the 
demand for and the supply of oil, with the demand for and supply of every other 
source of commercial energy actually rising between the end of 1979 and the 
end of 1981 and, in some instances, the end of 1982. 
5) World reserves of coal are five times those of oil, the source of energy with 
A number of items of quantitative data that are of relevance to the discussion have been grouped 
together in the Statistical Appendix. 
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the second largest reserves. Nevertheless, oil remains the largest single source 
in international trade, and the largest supplier of energy for consumption, 
despite the decline in its position. 
6) It is particularly urgent for the Arab oil producers, who have suffered most in 
the current oil crisis, to probe deeper into the nature, the causes, the impact, 
and the implications of the crisis in order to assess its magnitude correctly, to 
draw the useful lessons it has for them, and to chart the future course of their 
economies accordingly. 
7) Finally, even if the angle of vision is broadened to include the world at large 
and the field of energy in its entirety, it can be seen that the drop in the price of 
oil and the development of a buyers' market, will have adverse effects for 
everybody, to the extent that a lower price for oil will disguise the urgency of, 
and weaken the incentives for the search for and the development of, new 
sources of energy, and will expose the world to another era of tightness in oil 
supplies and soaring prices, possibly within the course of a recurring cycle of 
strong demand pushing prices sharply upwards, followed by soft demand 
pushing them downwards. The emergence of such a cyclical pattern will be 
harmful to orderly economic growth and to the predictability of expectations of 
supply, demand, and prices. Obviously, this would be damaging to the interests 
of exporters and importers alike. 
Causes of the Crisis 
Several interrelated causes lie behind the crisis, and while some are of a 
transient nature and have been occasioned by the tangible upward adjustment 
of the price of oil in 1973-4 and in 1979-80, and by anxiety surrounding the 
security of oil supplies, most are of a longer-term nature that would have come 
into operation without the adjustment, even if at a later stage, because oil is a 
finite and non-renewable resource. Although this paper is meant to take the 
crisis as given and to focus more on its implications for the future of the Arab 
economies, it is necessary for a more probing and meaningful exploration of the 
implications to be based on a better understanding of the operative causes. This 
can be seen to be true even though the oil resource is not the only major 
determinant of Arab economic development. Reflection on the array of 
resources and forces involved in development, and on the experience of the 
Arab economies over the past decade, indicates that oil has become the most 
vital economic resource (and force) in the process of development. There is 
enough evidence to support this generalisation, not only with regard to the 
oil-exporting Arab countries but also, though to a lesser degree, with regard to 
the non-oil Arab countries. 
To say that the correction of oil prices during the 1970s, though less 
substantial in real than in nominal terms, set the process of crisis generation in 
motion, is not to criticise the correction of prices and to endorse the 
condemnation which the OECD countries heap on OPEC as a result. Indeed, a 
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very compelling case can be, and has been, made for price correction.2 But, and 
this is a substantial 'but', price correction as experienced expedited the 
emergence of the developments that together constitute the crisis, and 
contributed to their magnitude and escalation, essentially because of an 
institutional-political factor. 
Price correction was undertaken by OPEC governments through unilateral 
action in mid-October 1973, by taking control over their oil resources and 
assuming the power to formulate and implement price and production policies, 
without any further submission to the veto power of the giant concessionary oil 
companies, and, by projection, of the Western governments of whose 
economic-political power structure these companies were an integral part. The 
undoing of this structure by Third World countries that had for generations 
occupied a humble position in the hierarchy of the international order and 
power system was intolerable to the Western industrial countries. Conse- 
quently, these countries reasoned that action had to be taken without delay to 
deter OPEC members from further 'insubordination' and to counteract and 
undo as much of their new power as possible. In fact, the Western reaction went 
further and included a wide array of components, including angry condemna- 
tion and denigration in the media, overtones of racist attacks directed mainly 
against the Arab oil exporters, to threats of military action by responsible 
politicians.3 The economic and technological reactions of the West were meant 
2 The literature on pricing is considerable, though probably more has been written by the critics of 
OPEC's pricing policies than by the defendants. For a discussion of pricing and for references of 
relevance to the 1970s, see: Fadhil J Al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry: a 
changing structure, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980; Ian Seymour, OPEC: instrument of 
change, London: Macmillan, 1980; J E Hartshorn, Objectives of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, Nicosia: Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications, 1978. Prepared in 
co-operation with Middle East Economic Survey (a weekly review of oil, finance and banking, 
and political developments) and Energy Economics Research Limited, Nicosia; Petroleum 
Economist, OPEC Oil Report (2nd edn) London, 1979; Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil (ed), Papers 
on the Economics of Oil: a producer's view, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, Nos 4, 6, and 
7; Various issues of OPEC Review, published by OPEC, Vienna. and Oil and Arab Cooperation, 
a monthly in Arabic, published by OAPEC in Kuwait, for articles on the subject of prices and 
pricing; Yusif A Sayigh, Arab Oil Policies in the 1 970s: opportunity and responsibility London: 
Croom Helm, and Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, chapter 3. 
Marwan R Buheiry, US Threats of Intervention Against Arab Oil: 1973-1979, Beirut: Institute 
for Palestine Studies, Paper No. 4, 1980. This booklet is well documented. For references to 
Western attitudes, see J E Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments: an account of the 
international oil industry in its political environment, London: Faber and Faber, 1967, esp. pp 
66-8: see also James E Akins, 'OPEC Actions: consumer reactions 1970-2000' in OPEC, 
OPEC and Future Energy Markets, London: Macmillan, 1980, pp 215-38. 
In this connection, Sayigh (op. cit., note 17, p 262) says: 'The hostility to OPEC has expressed 
itself over the years in a large number of articles, news reports, commentaries, and cartoons in the 
Western press. As recently as the last few months of 1981 and the first quarter of 1982, several 
articles were published revealing undisguised gloating over the troubles that OPEC was having 
owing to the glut in the market and the resultant depressed prices. Some spoke of the 'death' of 
OPEC: William Brown of the Hudson Institute, a long-standing critic of OPEC. said 'OPEC is 
100 per cent dead' (International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1982). Robert I Samuelson (IHT, on 
the same day) said, 'Oil prices are falling and OPEC is scrambling to prevent a total collapse. If it 
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to deflate the new power of the Arab oil exporters and therefore to reduce the 
dependence of the OECD countries on Arab (and non-Arab) OPEC oil, by 
reducing the demand for it and forcing its price downwards. In the process, it 
was expected that OPEC itself would be considerably weakened, if not 
completely dismantled. 
Two short-term reactions can be cited here. The first was the slowing down of 
economic growth in the advanced market economies, which by the end of 1982 
had resulted in near-zero growth. Although oil prices cannot be wholly blamed 
for this development, with signs of economic strain and of unemployment 
preceding oil price correction, a part of the blame must be borne by them. The 
second reaction came as a dual response to the price rise in 1979, to the 
revolution in Iran in 1979, and later, in September 1980, to the Iraq-Iran war. 
Together, these events led to panic in the market and to heavy stocking. The 
stocks accumulated in 1979-80, estimated to have peaked at a certain time at 5 
billion barrels, were later to press downwards on the price structure, through 
unduly high destocking in 1981-3. 
However, the current crisis is more appropriately explainable in longer-term 
reactions, namely in the conservation measures adopted generally, but more 
particularly (and effectively) in the Western industrial countries. Consumption 
shrank as a result of deliberate energy-saving policies, but also in response to 
the effort to devise and apply energy-saving technologies in industry, transport, 
and household uses. At the same time, another three developments added 
downward pressure on OPEC oil: energy substitution, with greater recourse to 
coal, nuclear energy and gas at the expense of OPEC oil; a shift away from 
OPEC oil to non-OPEC oil, particularly from the North Sea and Mexico; and, 
the weakening of the 'historical link' between energy consumption and 
economic growth. 
Over and above these various developments along the profile of known and 
established sources of energy, the search for and development of new sources 
was accelerated during the period of high oil prices and a sellers' market. In 
addition, the search for new oilfields in the OECD countries was considerably 
intensified. Jt is both ironical and contrary to far-sighted economic logic that 
the efforts to find substitutes for oil in general, and for OPEC oil in particular, 
cannot, obituary writers from New York to Tokyo will gleefully proclaim the cartel's demise.' 
Articles containing equally undisguised hostility can be found in US News and World Report on 
15 March 1982 and Newsweek, 15 March 1982. See earlier articles both in Newsweek and Time, 
of 31 August 1.981. At the official level, a senior White House official was reported by Reuter on 
23 March 1982 as saying that after a long wait, they (the US) had begun to weaken the control of 
OPEC (An-Nahar of Beirut, 24 March 1982). In short, neither the Western objective of 
weakening OPEC and bringing about its disintegration, nor the gloating over the near- 
achievement of this objective, is a secret. And, in addition, the climate of hostility and hatred, 
with concentration on the Arab oil exporters, can be specially felt and seen in the style and 
vocabulary used and in the obviously racist and defamatory cartoons accompanying much of the 
writing about Arab exporters'. 
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have slackened with the shift to a buyers' market, even before notable success 
rewarded the efforts. And this is where the danger of the recurrence of the 
events of the past decade in a disequilibrating cycle really lies. (Would it be a 
ten-year cycle from peak to peak?) 
Understandably, much of the thinking and policy-formulation meant to 
redress the 'adverse' impact of price rises was undertaken by individual 
industrial countries in their capacity as sovereign states concerned with what 
they considered their national interests. However, a novel development 
characterised the years immediately following the price adjustment of 1973-4. 
This was the formation in November 1974 of the International Energy Agency 
by the OECD countries (except for Finland, France, and Iceland). The IEA's 
basic aims are: 
a) cooperation among IEA participating countries to reduce excessive 
dependence on oil through energy conservation, development of alterna- 
tive energy sources and energy research and development; 
b) an information system on the international oil market as well as consulta- 
tion with oil companies; 
c) cooperation with oil-producing and other oil-consuming countries with a 
view to developing a stable international energy trade as well as the rational 
management and use of world energy resources in the interest of all 
countries; and 
d) a plan to prepare participating countries against the risk of a major 
disruption of oil supplies and to share available oil in the event of an 
emergency.' 
The formation of the IEA came not only as an economic response to the 
price adjustments of 1973-4, but also as an institutional-political response to 
OPEC's new-found power upon its assumption of the 'policy of control' in 
mid-October 1973. The IEA was also meant as an instrument for the design 
and promotion of measures to contain the power of OPEC and OPEC oil alike. 
This is the true sense of the basic aims of IEA which no euphemism can conceal. 
Impact of the Crisis on the Arab Economies 
The current oil crisis acquires its dimensions from objective, measurable 
causes, but also from the perception of those on whom the incidence of the 
crisis falls. And the incidence on the Arab oil-exporting countries, in my view, 
is a function both of attitudes, policies, and measures outside the control of 
these countries, and of a combination of 'sins of omission and of commission' 
generated within the Arab region. Here we refer not to the pricing of oil but to 
the complex of Arab attitudes, policies, and behaviour relating to a number of 
basic issues. We will present these further on, in order to show why there is 
justifiable anxiety about the effects of the oil crisis on the Arab economies, and 
I Quoted from the inside cover of International Energy Agency, OECD-IEA Parliamentary 
Symposium, Energy and the Economy, 10-11 April 1981, Paris: OECD-IEA, 1981. 
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what the future could bring to these economies if the Arabs fail to correct the 
effects of the crisis and prevent it from recurring. 
Before we indicate where Arab policymakers erred in the decade 1973-83, 
we ought in fairness to put on record a major extenuating factor, which is that 
the assumption of the power of policy formulation and implementation is only a 
decade old-which is a very short period for adequate 'apprenticeship' in 
policymaking and decisionmaking. Under the circumstances, the Arab sins of 
omission and of commission are not only understandable, but also largely 
forgivable. But to understand and to forgive is not to erase the slate of history. 
With this point made, the internally-based issues will now be presented: 
1) Perhaps at the root of the problem is the excessive enchantment with the 
scale and magnitude of oil revenues earned after 1973, and particularly with 
the rate of increase in these revenues, along with the complacency that the 
revenues came to create in the Arab oil countries and, indeed, in the region as a 
whole.5 The complacency had serious far-reaching implications, including an 
exaggerated faith in the power of money at the expense of other more 
fundamental and powerful determinants of development. 
2) Admittedly, the rise in revenues derived more from the rise in export price 
per barrel than from the expansion in production. Nonetheless, average 
production by the seven Arab members of OPEC in the 1970s was 2.2 times as 
high as that in the 1 960s.6 The powerful combination of higher prices and larger 
exports led to the vast increase in export revenues. These in turn made possible 
a vast expansion in the import of consumption and capital goods and services, 
which were acquired to meet the pent-up demand of consumers for necessities 
as well as for a wide range of luxuries, and to meet the demand of investors in 
the public and private sectors alike, who launched very ambitious 'develop- 
ment' programmes.7 Domestic production could only satisfy a rather small 
proportion of the vastly expanded demand. It was this new purchasing power 
which in large part consequently created far greater linkages and integration 
The oil revenues of the Arab members of OPEC amounted to $4,534 million in 1970, but to 
$134,916 million in 1979. They averaged $49,018.8 million for the decade of the 1970s. (See 
Sayigh, op. cit., Table 4.2 p 181.) 
6 Production rose from 4.3 million barrels/day in 1960 to 12.5 million b/d in 1969, with an average 
of 7.9 million b/d for the decade. During the 1970s, it rose from 13.8 million b/d in 1970 to 21.1 
million b/d in 1979, with an average of 17.3 million b/d for the decade. (Savigh,op. cit., Table 4.2 
p 181.) 
Investment allocations according to development plans in the second half of the 1970s for the 
Arab countries excepting Bahrain, Qatar, and Jibouti totalled $326,119 million. See Arab Fund 
for Economic and Social Development, Study on the Development of Human and Manpower 
Resources in the Arab Region (Kuwait, 1978) mimeograph, pp 17, 43, 44 (in Arabic). However, 
vast increases in budget allocations were introduced in the late 1970s into the plans for the first 
half of the 1980s. Thus, Saudi Arabia, whose plan for 1975-80 had been the largest among Arab 
plans, officially reported that it would raise investment allocations by $119.7 billion for 1980-5. 
Other countries raised their allocations by an estimated $35 billion. For Saudi Arabia, see Middle 
East Economic Survey 23(21), 10 March 1980. For the other countries, the estimate is reported 
in Sayigh, op. cit., p 193. 
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with the production machinery and markets of the advanced industrial 
countries than with the Arab countries. This the oil sector achieved through the 
recycling of oil revenues, in addition to the aspect of integration connected with 
the export of oil. 
3) While much of the importation can be explained and justified, much defies 
justification. Thus, the 'consumerism' that blossomed in the 1970s is not only 
morally reprehensible, but also economically short-sighted and damaging, in 
that it has already cultivated patterns of behaviour that are difficult and painful 
to uproot, and it has diverted resources that to an appreciable extent could have 
been saved and invested. On the other hand, not all the investments made fell 
into a rational system of priorities or led to sound overall economic and social 
development,8 although they brought about concrete improvements in the 
economic and social infrastructure and a rise in the rate of economic growth. 
4) Irrespective of the degree of real need or urgency for imports, whether 
consumers' or producers' goods and services, a significant proportion of these 
imports could be produced within the Arab region, if development had been so 
directed as to lead primarily to the building of national and regional productive 
capability and capacity. This is truest of goods and services calling for simpler 
technologies, and most particularly of agricultural commodities. 
5) The financial resources which were used for local consumption and 
investment, for imports, and for aid to Third World countries and support to 
international organisations, together fell short of the oil revenues earned. Most 
of the surpluses have gone to Western money markets for placement. While a 
part of these surpluses went into direct investment, the larger part was subject 
to the eroding effect of inflation and has lost heavily in purchasing power as a 
result. 
6) What looked like the acquisition by the Arab countries of greater power and 
political leverage in the international system and the economic order, proves 
today to be largely illusory. The greater degree of interdependence vaunted, 
between the Arab and the Western industrial countries, is in effect a greater 
degree of dependence by the Arab on the Western countries than ever before. 
One statistical indicator of this dependency can be found in the ratio of the 
external sector (imports plus exports) to Gross National Product. This sector 
amounted to 60 per cent of GNP for the whole Arab region in 1970, but rose to 
94 per cent for 1979.9 Another way of looking at the enormity (and danger) of 
8 See, for instance, Galal A Amin, The Modernisation of Poverty, Leiden: E J Brill, 1974; Yusif A 
Sayigh, 'A Critical Assessment of Arab Economic Development, 1945-77', in United Nations 
Commission for Western Asia, Population Bulletin of the United Nations Commission for 
Western Asia, No. 17, December 1979, pp 32-45; Georges Corm, The Missed Development: 
studies in the Arab civilizational and developmental crisis, Beirut: Dar Al-Tali'at, 1981 (in 
Arabic): and Yusif A Sayigh, The Arab Economy: past performance and future prospects, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, chapters 10 and 11. 
I For 1970, see Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Study of the Developmental 
Achievements of the Arab Homeland in the Seventies, and the Outlook for the Eighties (Kuwait, 
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this dependency is to consider the fast-increasing insecurity of the Arab 
economies, represented by the huge imports of consumer goods (including 
food imports, every Arab country today being a net importer of wheat), the 
hardware and software of technology, and armaments. Furthermore, the large 
financial reserves outside the Arab region, currently estimated at about $350 
billion, can turn into a much more powerful pressure mechanism in the hands of 
OECD countries than in Arab hands. The political and security implications of 
this aspect of dependency can hardly be overestimated. 
The presentation of these developments is not meant to indicate or even to 
suggest that the 'oil era' has not also produced a number of concrete, positive 
results that are directly attributable to the takeover of control of the oil sector 
and the significant appreciation in value of the oil resources, and, therefore, the 
accrual of substantial oil revenues. Yet the performance of the Arab economies 
(whether or not oil-producing) though improved in several respects, is not the 
object of this article. It is instead concerned with the inner causes and structure 
of the current oil crisis, and how this crisis impinges on the future health and 
progress of the Arab economies. 
The crisis would not loom as large as it does today had the attitudes, the 
policies, and the behaviour of the oil countries, in the areas associated with the 
oil resource, been sufficiently different to avoid the shortcomings and the 
imbalances and distortions just listed that have beset the Arab economies. This 
may sound tautological, but it is in fact the statement of a causal relationship. In 
brief, this reiationship attributes the distorted economic performance in the 
different aspects indicated to certain attitudes aind policies which were, in turn, 
a function of the acceleration of oil production in the 1 970s, the vast expansion 
of the oil revenues accruing, and the way in which these revenues were utilised. 
That the crisis clearly has other extraneous causes and manifestations does not 
invalidate the allocation of a certain part of responsibility to internal causes. 
We would like to go further and say that the crisis would have been 
considerably more tolerable and manageable and much less damaging had the 
Arab oil policies been sounder and more far-sighted. 
The new oil era opened up great opportunities for the Arab countries but 
also laid upon them great responsibilities. A number of these were assumed 
creditably, particularly within the international context, in the sense that the oil 
exporters took the needs of the international community for oil and for foreign 
aid amply into account in their policies. But a number oL opportunities have 
been either missed or sub-optimally utilised. Three failings stand out in 
particular. The first is tne complacency with which the production and export of 
oi0 was expanded which generated revenues of a size which permitted 
1980) p 24 and Table 2 in Appendix 3. The percentage for 1979 has been calculated along the 
same lines by the present writer. 
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consumerism and wastefulness to the point where most oil countries today 
suffer financial stringency. 
The second failing was the faulty design of development plans and 
programmes, which frequently deviated seriously from a sound and defensible 
system of priorities. The implementation of the plans suffered because of 
over-ambitious budgets and the inadequacy of manpower skills and of 
available institutions. As a result, the plans and programmes proved to be 
excessively costly and wasteful. The third failing was the failure to lay enough 
stress on three crucial determinants of development: (i) the vigorous training of 
manpower in the skills on which modernising economies depend; (ii) the 
provision of opportunities to the Arab people to participate effectively in the 
process of decisionmaking, if true commitment to the objectives and efforts of 
development were to be obtained; and, (iii) the promotion of effective and 
far-reaching Arab economic complementarity. Complementarity would have 
made it possible to identify and utilise the much wider regional opportunities 
available for investment, markets, and a better allocation of manpower and 
financial resources. The new oil era opened up all of these opportunities. and 
their utilisation would have helped to avoid a large part of the distortion 
witnessed in the past decade. 
Outlook for the Future: two mainstream scenarios 
The serious distortions and imbalances generated by or associated with the oil 
era have blocked the course of Arab economic and social development. 
Consequently, they will have a lasting impact on the future of development and 
well-being in the region. It is therefore essential to read the lessons of the 
immediate past correctly and to look ahead into the future to consider what 
expectations are warranted, and to explore how the course of future events can 
be cleared and straightened. 
To simplify matters, we can say that two possible mainstream scenarios can 
portray the years ahead to the end of the 1980s. In the first the Arab oil 
exporters (and the non-oil Arab countries, whose attitudes, policies, and 
behaviour are considerably influenced by those of the oil exporters) will not 
draw and benefit from the main lessons which the crisis has clearly imparted. 
The central feature of this scenario is a grossly insufficient realisation by the 
Arab oil exporters that they bear a certain responsibility for the crisis because 
of the permissiveness with which they expanded production during the 1970s 
together with increased prices, and of their reaction to the availability of 
(relatively) vast financial resources. As a result, their economies and societies 
fell into faulty and dangerous grooves of consumerism and over-spending; 
incorrect investment priorities; confusion between mere growth and meaning- 
ful development; the equation of the importation of the hardware and software 
of advanced technology with the acquisition of technological capability; and 
satisfaction with the outward trimmings of power and influence in world 
51 
This content downloaded from 213.244.124.19 on Sat, 20 Dec 2014 03:10:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 
economic affairs at the expense of deeper concern with the consolidation of 
power on the sound foundations of development, Arab economic complemen- 
tarity, social cohesiveness, and popular political participation. 
The danger is that this pattern of attitudes, policies, and behaviour, which 
together constitute the backdrop to the 1980s, may have so hardened as to 
deter the political, social, and economic leadership from developing a new 
vision. They must realise that radical change is essential and critical. Change 
should begin with a new conceptualisation of the course of action required, and 
should inject a new discipline and a new orientation into the design and 
implementation of economic strategies, policies, and programmes. These 
should primarily aim at enabling the Arab societies first to live with the new 
realities, and secondly to change them as the underlying factors and forces are 
redirected and transformed. 
Under this scenario the failure sufficiently to realise and acknowledge 
responsibility will make the Arab countries seek short-term palliatives. The 
most dangerous of these is to seize the first opportunity of appreciably 
increased demand to expand oil production tangibly and/or to raise prices 
excessively, and thus to fall into the trap of the 'oil cycle', to which we referred 
earlier as a serious danger that must be avoided as far as possible. Three 
interrelated aspects of this danger must be stressed: (i) the danger of falling into 
the trap yet once again because of the mere fact of having fallen into it once 
before, in spite of the lessons and warnings that the current crisis has 
generously demonstrated; (ii) the danger of once again ignoring, even if only 
partially, the imperative of oil conservation for the dubious 'benefit' of the 
expansion in monetary revenues and surpluses; and, (iii) the danger of 
rationalising the dilution of the conservation imperative by the urgency of the 
acquisition of expanded financial resources for the pattern and scale of 
spending/investing which characterised the last few pre-crisis years, and thus 
downgrading the urgency of socioeconomic discipline and rationality. 
Admittedly, it is easier to make such pronouncements that are loaded with 
values and normative imperatives, than to design strategies and policies that 
embody them, and to actually implement the strategies and policies effectively. 
There are constraints and temptations that combine to make the design and 
implementation objectively difficult, and subjectively undesirable to 
decision-makers. The constraints refer to the international pressures that 
invoke the interests of the world economy and its health and growth, 
particularly if the productive capacity of non-OPEC countries does not expand 
considerably and speedily, and if non-oil sources of energy already developed 
are for one or more reasons not made to satisfy a much larger share of energy 
requirements than they now do, or yet if the search for new sources is allowed 
to slacken and falter further. They also refer to domestic pressures that invoke 
consumption and investment needs, even when these are in part unwarranted, 
wasteful, or misguided. 
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On the other hand, the temptations refer to the attractiveness of increased 
monetary revenues, of the recapture of the position of pre-eminence which 
OPEC oil had occupied or had (even if precariously and superficially) 
permitted to the major OPEC members, and of the sense of satisfaction which 
is gained from merely acceding to the pressures of domestic groups that had 
benefited enormously, in terms of private fortunes, from the era of free 
spending and insufficiently controlled government contracts. The combination 
of constraints and temptations may well be extremely difficult to resist except 
for the most enlightened and determined of leaderships. Furthermore, given 
the narrow political base of power in most of the Arab countries, and the 
limited 'international constituency' where the Arab countries can seek political 
support within the Western community,10 resistance will be additionally 
difficult. 
The need for discipline and far-sightedness is particularly great in view of the 
likelihood that different OPEC members may react differently to a change in 
conditions towards firmer demand and the opportunities this provides for 
expanded production and/or increased export prices. The absence of consensus 
could well bring about the adoption of different policies by different members, 
and the considerable weakening if not the fragmentation of OPEC, with a price 
and quota war which will pave the way for yet another oil cycle. 
But apart from these structural implications of the first scenario, it will have 
serious implications for aid and development at the national, the regional, and 
the international levels. Thus bilateral and multilateral foreign aid by the Arab 
oil exporters-though still substantial for 1981 and 1982-obviously cannot be 
maintained at its high level. Even within the Arab region, aid flows have 
become hesitant and in some instances certain commitments have not been 
met. Development budgets have been trimmed in almost every oil-exporting 
country, but this can be a blessing in disguise in many instances where the scale 
of priorities had not been carefully designed and where lavishness had been 
permitted. In short, Arab socioeconomic development could be slowed down 
for several years, if the opportunity to instil much greater discipline is not 
utilised in setting priorities, in the planning processes, and the design and 
implementation of programmes and projects. 
Conversely, the current crisis could prove useful, though painful, if its lessons 
were recognised and learned, as the second scenario stipulates. The central part 
of this scenario is the realisation that Arab policies had erred in certain 
fundamental respects, and the proper identification of the errors. Likewise, the 
realisation must include the conviction that the crisis could be the launching 
0 The weakness of Western support to the Arabs (not to say the hostility towards them) precedes 
the take-over of control of the oil industry in October 1973, when the initiative was taken by six 
OPEC members, all of whom except Iran were Arab. It derives from historical-religious factors, 
but relates in more recent times to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the extensive Western support of 
Israel. 
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pad ror basic reforms and the correction of attitudes, policies, and behaviour 
patterns. It must also include the identification of the proper course to be 
pursued if balanced, healthy development is to be promoted. Finally, the oil 
policies must be so designed as to embody delicate balance between the many 
interrelated and interacting components. 
These components often pull in different directions. Thus, as illustration, to 
expand production tangiblv in order to earn larger revenues would damage the 
conservation desideratum, yet to allow revenues to shrink would constrict 
development and welfare outlays domestically and development aid within the 
Arab region and the Third World at large. In fact, an integrated oil policy must 
provide for all its components to have room to operate, but must also reflect 
and express the dynamic interrelationships and interactions among these 
components, in such a manner as to indicate how the totality of the system 
behaves when one of its components changes. To 'solve' for an optimal system 
of policy-making would very much be as complicated and as delicate as to 
'solve' for a system of general equilibrium in academic economics. However, in 
both instances, the fundamental prerequisite for the system to reach equilib- 
rium is the proper definition of the various components and the understanding 
of their workings and impiications, individually and in interaction. 
The second scenario goes beyond the oil sector, even given the wide 
influence of oil in the economies of OPEC countries. One of the lessons which 
needs to be learned is to place oil resources (and oil revenues) in their proper 
place, without undue exaggeration or underestimation. This would mean 
assigning the proper weight to the sectors of industry and agriculture, and to 
education, training, and the acquisition of technological capability. The Arab 
region needs to become much more sensitised to the need to approach 
self-reliance in these sectors and areas, rather than to the deceptively easier 
course of importing whatever products and skills it needs. Several of the 
oil-exporting countries must progress from being rentier societies and become 
much more involved in direct productioni. 
To achieve this transformation it is necessary to create relationships of 
complementarity among Arab countries, in order to compensate for the 
handicaps from which some of them suffer in terms of small populations and a 
narrow economic base. National development efforts would benefit from a 
regional dimension. This would be true particularly in those cases (like the 
pursuit of agricultural security, the promotion of science and technology, the 
development of engineering industry, and-obviously-the pursuit of national 
security) where the mobilisation of the resources and capabilities of several 
countries would be essential and crucial for tangible desirable results to 
materialise. 
In brief, in all the instances to which reference has been made during the 
discussion of the second scenario, the current crisis could be of positive value 
for the future of the Arab economies and societies. Under this scenario, the 
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different aspects of the role of the oil resource will be crowned by two 
achievements. The first is that the crisis teaches us that to produce less oil 
currently will conserve more oil for the future, when Arab industrialisation 
accelerates to reach a high level of spread and performance, and to contribute 
substantially to Gross Domestic Product. This would involve a much heavier 
emphasis on refining and petrochemicals and, therefore, the need for smaller 
production than when the emphasis is on the export of crude. The second is that 
the crisis teaches us that the oil resource which is presently a large contributor 
to GDP can render a greater service to the Arab economies by becoming 
instrumental in reducing dependence on itself (that is, becoming rather 
superfluous in a sense), by promoting development. 
Conclusion 
Which of the two scenarios has a greater likelihood of coming true in the years to 
come? Almost certainly neither will unfold in its 'pure' state, as reality is rarely 
as stereotyped and stiffly categorised as theoretical or speculative models 
depict. Some of the lessons will be drawn and learned, and indeed there are 
indicators in support of this assertion. Foremost among these is concern with 
conservation, and a willingness within OPEC to programme production and, 
by and large, to adhere to the individual quotas assigned. But the acid test will 
come when the market firms up and demand exerts heavy pressure for 
substantially increased supply. Will the conservation discipline remain opera- 
tive then, or will complacency and over-concern with expanded revenues take 
over again, and lead once more to an oil cycle? 
However, some other lessons will probably not be drawn and learned 
adequately within the time horizon of the 1 980s. Foremost among these is the 
realisation that Arab economic development has been faulty in certain major 
aspects, and that it needs to undergo basic changes in its objectives, content, 
strategies, policies, programmes, and mechanisms. Especially dangerous in this 
context is the narrow base of political participation which we expect to 
characterise Arab societies in the immediate future. Possibly, the future will 
bring with it a clearer understanding of what sound oil policies are and ought to 
be, but the Arab economies in general will continue to suffer from insufficient 
awareness of the imbalances and distortions of development as it unfolded 
over the past decade, and the corrective process here will be even below the 
level of this limited awareness. 
On balance, the current crisis threatens to leave much of its unhealthy mark 
on the Arab economies for the coming years. The note of hope that we feel is 
warranted here is that the economies could be so unhealthy and in such disarray 
as a result of the current crisis, that the need for reappraisal and correction 
would force itself on the consciousness of the political and other leaderships. In 
other words, the men and women of the region, who are both the agents and the 
beneficiaries of development, would force their interests and their voices on 
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the leaderships in their pressure for radical change; and the debilitating effects 
of political and economic fragmentation of the Arabs would force to the front 
both a regional approach to problems and a regional mobilisation of resources 
and resourcefulness. 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Table 1: Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 
a) Oil (billion barrels, end 1982): 
World 670.2 
OAPEC 347.0 
OPEC 447.8 
OAPEC/World 51.8% 
OPEC/World 66.8% 
b) Gas (billion cubic metres, end 1982): 
World 85,652 
OAPEC 12,126 
OPEC 28,631 
OAPEC/ World 14.2% 
OPEC/World 33.4% 
Table 2: Oil Production (1000 barrels/day) 
1982: World 54,572 
OAPEC 12,756 
OPEC 18,398 
OAPEC/World 23.4% 
OPEC/World 33.7% 
1979: World 63,185 
OAPEC 22,204 
OPEC 31,209 
OAPEC/World 35.1% 
OPEC/World 49.4% 
1973: World 55,803 
OAPEC 18,340 
OPEC 30,979 
OAPEC/World 32.9% 
OPEC/World 55.5% 
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Table 3: World Energy Consumption (million petroleum barrel equivalent) 
1979 1980 1981 
mn pbe % mn pbe % mn pbe % 
Oil 64.1 45.7 61.6 44.1 59.8 43.1 
Natural Gas 25.6 18.2 26.1 18.7 26.6 19.2 
Coal 39.5 28.1 40.1 29.0 40.1 28.9 
Nuclear 3.1 2.2 3.3 2.4 3.82 2.8 
Hydroelectric 8.16 5.8 8.29 5.8 8.33 6.0 
Total 140.5 100.0 139.4 100.0 138.7 100.0 
Table 4: Oil Revenues for Seven Arab Members of OPEC ($ billion) 
1961 1.2 
1970 4.5 
1973 12.5 
1974 51.5 
1979 134.9 
1980 204.2 
1981 189.0 
1982 142.6 
Table 5: Gross Domestic Product ($ million at current prices) 
1979 1980 1981 
Arab OPEC Members 205,919 292,524 281,542 
Other Arab Countries 76,313 91,519 96,589 
Total 21 Countries 282,232 384,043 378,131 
Table 6: Commodity and Service Exports ($ million) 
1979 1980 1981 
Oil Exports 142,183 214,093 198,317 
Non-Oil Exports 7,383 13,909 12,298 
Total 21 Countries 149,566 228,002 210,615 
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Table 7: Commodity and Service Imports ($ million) 
1979 1980 1981 
Arab OPEC Members 77,406 106,419 121,206 
Other Arab Countries 30,206 39,350 47,843 
Total 21 Countries 107,612 145,769 169,049 
Table 8: Consumption, Private and Public ($ million) 
1979 1980 1981 
Arab OPEC Members 89,988 120,938 136,467 
Other Arab Countries 61,045 78,895 84,717 
Total 21 Countries 151,033 199,833 221,184 
Table 9: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Private and Public ($ million) 
1979 1980 1981 
Arab OPEC Countries 61,772 79,324 88,296 
Other Arab Countries 17,380 22,653 27,086 
Total 21 Countries 79,152 101,977 115,382 
Sources: 
a) Items 1, 2, 3, and 4: OAPEC, Secretary-General's Eighth Annual Report, 
1981. Kuwait 1982 (Arabic); and OAPEC, Secretary-General's Ninth 
Annual Report, 1982. Kuwait 1983 (in Arabic). 
b) Item 4 for revenues: for the years 1961,1970,1973,1974,1979, and 1980: 
Middle East Economic Survey, 25(1) 19 October 1981. For 1981 and 1982: 
OAPEC, Secretary-General's Ninth Annual Report, 1982, p 67. 
c) Items 5-9: Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, Arab 
Monetary Fund, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and 
OAPEC, Consolidated Arab Economic Report 1981. 1982 (in Arabic), 
'Table 2.7, p 195; and Consolidated Arab Economic Report 1982. 1983 (in 
Arabic). Tables 2.1 and 2.2, pp 147 and 148. 
NOTE 
The title originally suggested by the author for this article was: 'The Current 
Oil Crisis and the Future of the Arab Economies'. 
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